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Abstract 
Labour market risk structures have changed quite dramatically since the early postwar years. 
Long-term unemployment, low wage employment and the associated problem of the working 
poor, and clashes between work and family life constitute today the most widespread social 
risks. They were not well covered by the welfare states that were built during the postwar years. 
Today, however, some welfare states, in the Nordic countries, seem much more effective in 
dealing with these new risks. In this paper it is argued that this is a result of different policy 
decisions taken in response to deindustrialisation and the loss of manufacturing employment 
since the 1970s. 
 
Résumé 
Les risques sociaux associés au marché di travail ont changé passablement au cours des deux 
dernières décennies. Aujourd’hui, les risques les plus importants et répandus sont le chômage 
de longue durée, la pauvreté laborieuse, et l’incompatibilité entre travail et vie familiale.  Ces 
nouveaux risques sociaux ne sont en général pas pris en charge par les Etats sociaux que nous 
avons hérités de la période des trente glorieuses (1945-1975). Aujourd’hui, toutefois, certains 
pays, essentiellement le pays Nordiques, semblent avoir mieux réussi à maîtriser ces risques. 
La thèse défendue dans ce papier met l’accent sur l’importance de décisions prises à partir des 
années 1970s pour faire face au déclin de l’emploi industriel. 
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Introduction 
 
Labour market risk structures have changed quite dramatically since the early postwar years. 
Unemployment, essentially a cyclical risk during the golden age of western capitalism, has 
become a structural feature of today’s labour markets. In addition, trends in earnings 
inequality and labour market instability mean that today, employment income alone is 
sometimes not sufficient to ensure a poverty-free existence, especially for families with 
children and single parent households. Labour markets interact with family structures to 
create entirely new types of social risks. The risk of poverty is lower among the increasingly 
numerous two-earner couples, who are nonetheless facing entirely new problems and 
dilemmas in terms of reconciling work and family life. All these contingencies can be labelled 
"new social risks" and refer to situations that are typical of the postindustrial labour market 
and family structures in which we live today. They have little in common except the fact that 
they are generally not well covered by the welfare states that we have inherited from the 
postwar years, and that they tend to hit the same social groups, especially younger people, 
women and those with low skills (Armingeon and Bonoli 2006; Bonoli 2007). 
 
Current labour market risk structures are the result of two challenges, often conflated in the 
literature, but quite different in the real world: deindustrialisation and the tertiatrisation of 
employment. Deindustrialistaion, defined in terms of rapid decline in manufacturing 
employment, has generated large numbers of jobless who were particularly difficult to 
reintegrate in the new expanding service economy. As a result, deindustrialisation is 
responsible for the emergence of long-term and mass unemployment, with all its 
consequences in terms of social exclusion, and disruption. But deindustrialisation may neither 
be the only nor the most important feature of the current transformation in labour market 
structures. In fact, the new, service-based labour markets that are emerging in western 
economies are characterised by strong polarisation and inegalitarian pressures. Job creation in 
service-based economies tends to bifurcate between high skill, high wage sectors (finance, 
information and communication technology, produces’services) and low skill, low wage 
activities (retail trade, hotels and restaurants, personal services). The results are more unequal 
labour markets or, to the extent that countries try to resist this sort of pressures, more 
unemployment.  
 
Countries responded first to the most urgent and visible challenge, deindustrialisation, and 
they did that in rather different ways. Generally speaking, they developed new policies that 
were in line with their long-standing political economy and welfare state traditions. For 
English speaking countries, the dominant policy-orientation was labour-market deregulation 
and liberalisation; continental European countries strengthened employment protection and 
income replacement programmes (especially early retirement) so as to reduce labour supply 
and open unemployment; Nordic countries, finally, developed an approach based on the 
expansion of employment through active labour market polices and public social services.  
 
These three strategies, which are briefly reviewed below, fare very differently in relation to 
the second postindustrial challenge: tertiarisation. First, in a service-based economy, labour 
market liberalisation generates stark inequalities and social problems for those at the bottom 
of the wage distribution. This is the trajectory followed by countries like the US or the UK. 
Second, employment protection and generous labour market exit provision, for example in the 
shape of early retirement schemes, results in barriers to employment for low skill workers and 
high labour costs, which in turn produce high rates of unemployment. It is the root of the 
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employment problems faced by countries like Italy, Germany or France. Finally, whether 
through wisdom or luck, the response to deindustrialisation that seems to fit best in the current 
service-based employment structure is the one adopted in the Nordic countries. Active labour 
market polices and public social services are a clear asset in managing a labour market that 
tends to be polarised. ALMPs allow the upskilling of workers and social services, especially 
in the fields of childcare and elderly care facilitate women’s employment. 
 
The superiority of the Nordic response to both labour market challenges is increasingly been 
recognised, sometimes explicitly, but much more often implicitly. Governments outside 
Scandinavia have, over the last ten years or so, put increasingly strong emphasis on the two 
pillars of the Nordic response to postindustrialisation: ALMPs and public social services. The 
EU, through the European Employment Strategy, is clearly pushing countries in the direction 
of a variant of the Nordic model, with high rates of employment for all groups, especially 
women, with state support through child care services and ALMPs (Bertozzi and Bonoli 
2002). 
 
This chapter presents and illustrates this two-staged process of policy adaptation. The 
argument presented introduces a chronological dimension in the study of labour market 
policy, by distinguishing between different stages in the adaptation process1. Other studies 
have emphasised sequences of policy adjustment (Hall 1993; Hemerijck and Schludi 2000), 
but they have generally tended to pay more attention to learning processes. Here, instead, we 
focus on the impact of decisions taken at time t on policy problems emerging at time t +1.  
The chapter starts by reviewing the key elements of the new postindustrial labour market risk 
structures. It then moves on to an account of the policy trajectories adopted in response to 
deindustrialisation in different groups of countries, and shows how different responses turn 
out to be more or less suitable to the service-based economies that are dominant today. Third, 
it looks at how countries having embarked in sub-optimal reform paths are now trying to shift 
to more efficient policy solutions.  
Post-industrial labour market risks 
 
Post-industrial labour markets differ from the sort of employment structures that were 
dominant in the postwar years in many respects. First, of course, a smaller proportion of the 
working population is employed in manufacturing, and the service sector provides the vast 
majority of jobs.  
 
Second, and this is to a large extent a consequence of the point just made, there are important 
differences in terms of life chances and career opportunities for low skill individuals.  Persons 
belonging to this category have always been disadvantaged. However, during the postwar 
years, low skill workers were predominantly employed in manufacturing industry. They were 
able to benefit from productivity increases due to technological advances, so that their wages 
rose in line with those of the rest of the population. The strong mobilising capacity of the 
trade unions among industrial workers further sustained their wages which came to constitute 
the guarantee of a poverty-free existence. Today, low skill individuals are mostly employed in 
the low-value added service sector or unemployed. Low value added services such as retail 
sale, cleaning, catering, and so forth are known for providing very little scope for productivity 
increases (Pierson 1998). In countries where wage determination is essentially based on 
                                                 
1 On the importance of considering the chronological dimension of political phenomena, see Pierson, P. (2004). 
Politics in Time. Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
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market mechanisms, this means that low skill individuals are seriously exposed to the risk of 
being paid a poverty wage (US, UK, Switzerland). The situation is different in countries 
where wage determination, especially at the lower end of the distribution, is controlled by 
governments (through generous minimum wage legislation) or by the social partners (through 
encompassing collective agreements). Under these circumstances, the wages of low skill 
workers are protected, but job creation in these sectors is limited, so that many low skill 
individuals are in fact unemployed. Overall, the fact of possessing low or obsolete skills today 
entails a major risk of welfare loss, considerably higher than in the postwar years. 
 
Third, partly as a consequence of the tertiarisation of labor markets, postindustrial 
employment is considerably more feminised. In the late 1960s in the Nordic countries, in the 
1980s in English speaking countries and in the 1990s in continental Europe we see the take 
off of female employment. Married women and women with children, two categories of the 
working age population who tended not to be involved in paid work, are increasingly less 
likely to exit from the labour market. In spite of big steps towards gender equality in the 
labour market, women’s career profiles remain different from those of men. Women are still 
more likely to have career histories punctuated by periods of inactivity, usually after chid 
birth. Everywhere, they are more likely to work part-time. And finally, are on average less 
well paid then men. In these respects, women’s entry into employment has generated a new 
dimension of stratification in labour market. 
 
As already hinted, these three important developments, tertiarisation, skill polarisation and 
feminisation of labour markets are responsible for the emergence of new, postindustrial, 
labour market risks. These are discussed next. 
 
Long term unemployment 
Long term unemployment is a feature of post-industrial economies. During the postwar 
expansion years, unemployment, where it existed was essentially frictional or cyclical. Today, 
instead, virtually every developed market economy is confronted with the problem of 
structural, long term unemployment. Current long term unemployment has essentially too 
roots: deindustrialisation and the institutional rigidities in service-based labour markets 
mentioned above. 
 
Deindustrialisation is a decade long process, whereby low skill manufacturing jobs are 
transferred to low income countries or taken over by machines. The result is a more or less 
constant decline in industrial employment in the traditional OECD countries since the 1970s. 
Deindustrialisation presents a problem for labour markets because it destroys low skill jobs. 
The individuals who are as a result left without employment cannot easily re-enter other 
segments of the labour market. The skills acquired through years of experience in 
manufacturing industry are not easily transferable to service occupations. The archetypical 
example is that of a metal worker or a miner. After several years spent in this sort of 
occupations, learning a new profession which perhaps implies sophisticated social skills is 
extremely difficult. Deindustrialisation is as a result a major source of social risk in modern 
societies and an important cause of structural unemployment (Iversen 2001). Chronologically, 
it is also the first post-industrial trend to affect labour market risk for large sections of western 
societies.  
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Fig. 1. Industrial employment as a percent of total employment and unemployment rate in 
Sweden, Germany and in the UK, 1970-2001. 
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Deindustrialisation causes unemployment and particularly long term unemployment in the 
1970s and 1980s. Most countries experience sharp rises in the rate of unemployment in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, which can be largely attributed to the loss of manufacturing jobs. 
Figure 1 illustrates this development by looking at three countries that are typical of the 
different postindustrial labour market trajectories: Sweden, Germany and the UK. In spite of 
the differences, which will be discussed more in detail below, the three countries clearly 
follow a similar path: fewer industrial jobs and higher rates of unemployment.  
 
Deindustrialisation explains the initial stages of the emergence of mass unemployment. It 
does not, however, explain current variation in unemployment levels across countries. Figure 
1 also shows that Germany, of the three countries the one with the highest proportion of jobs 
in manufacturing, is also experiencing the highest rate of unemployment. Most labour 
economists today agree that in the current postindustrial context, one of the main causes 
behind differences in unemployment rates, is variation in the extent of employment protection 
and other forms of labour market rigidity such as high minimum wages (Esping-Andersen 
2000; Nickell 2003). The sort of service-based low skill jobs that are needed to mop up 
unemployment today, are only created in relatively deregulated labour markets (Iversen and 
Wren 1998).   
 
Low wage, bad quality employment 
Low wage, bad quality employment is the price to pay, in a postindustrial economy, in order 
to avoid or to contain the problem of long term and mass unemployment. Deregulated labour 
markets favour job creating in the low skill service sector, but the other side of the coin is a 
segment of the labour market characterised by low wages, often providing incomes that fall 
below the poverty line, and bad quality employment in the sense of the level of social 
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protection associated with it and the opportunities for career advancement (Esping-Andersen 
1999) (Iversen and Wren 1998). This is the case above all in the US but also in other mostly 
liberal labour markets, such as Britain and Switzerland. Those countries are confronted since 
the 1980s with the problem of the “working poor” individuals that in spite of a job, often a 
full time job, live with incomes below the poverty line. It is a phenomenon that was unheard 
of during the postwar years.  
 
Labour market deregulation results in low pay but often also in new forms of atypical 
employment, which are often not well protected by the sort of social security programmes that 
were built during the postwar years. Pension coverage, in most western European countries, is 
optimal for workers who spend their entire working life in full time employment. Part-time 
work usually results in reduced pension entitlements, as do career interruptions due to 
childbearing. The result of the presence of these new career profiles in the labour market may 
be, if pension systems are not adapted, the translation of the labour market and working poor 
problems of today into a poverty problem for older people in thirty of forty years time. From 
an individual point if view, the fact of following an “atypical” career pattern represents a risk 
of insufficient social security coverage, and hence a loss of welfare.  
 
Reconciling work and family life 
The massive entry of women in the labour market has meant that the standard division of 
labour within families that was typical of the postwar years has collapsed. The domestic and 
child care work that used to be performed on an unpaid basis by housewives now needs to be 
externalised. It can be either obtained from the state or bought on the market. The difficulties 
faced by families in this respect (but most significantly by women) are a major source of 
frustration and can result in important losses of welfare, for example if a parent reduces 
working hours because of the unavailability of adequate child care facilities. To the extent that 
dual earner couples with children are considerably less likely to be in poverty than families 
that follow the "male breadwinner model" (Esping-Andersen 2002) : 58), inability to 
reconcile work and family life, can, especially for low income parents, be associated with a 
poverty risk.  
 
New social risks in postindustrial societies 
These situations are caused by different factors, but have a number of things in common. First 
they are all “new”, in the sense that they are typical of the postindustrial societies in which we 
live today. During the trente glorieuses, the period of male full employment and sustained 
economic growth that characterised the postwar years, these risks were extremely marginal, if 
they existed at all. Second, different new social risks tend to be concentrated on the same 
groups of individuals, usually younger people, families with small children, or working 
women. While it is difficult to set clear borders around the section of the population that is 
mostly exposed to new social risks, it is clear that the categories mentioned here are to some 
extent overlapping. The partially overlapping character of new social risks results in the 
existence of a more or less large section of the population that is hit by various contingencies. 
Low skill single parents; low income working mothers or low skill youth unemployed people 
are likely to experience additional difficulties because of the accumulation of disadvantage 
that affects their position. These situations are also those that most often result in social 
exclusion (Room 1999). 
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Third, new social risk groups have a further thing in common. They are generally not well 
served by the postwar welfare states. These tended to focus their efforts on core workers with 
stable employment and uninterrupted careers. In an ideal-typical postwar welfare state, 
concerned above all with the preservation of the income of the male breadwinner, the groups 
identified here as mostly exposed to new social risk do not benefit from social policies.  
 
Responding to new labour market risks: deindustrialisation 
The 1970s and early 1980s were difficult times for western labour markets. While most 
advanced democracy had managed to keep full employment until the mid 1970s, between 
1974 and 1983 unemployment rates soared throughout industrial countries. In the seven big 
economies (G7), the unemployment rate increased from 3.7% to 8.2 % during this period 
(OECD, Statistical Compendium, 2006). Countries responded in different ways to what they 
perceive as a truly new challenge. The trajectories followed by western countries in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s are widely documented in the 
literature (Katzenstein 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990; Hall 1993; Esping-Andersen 1996; 
Hemerijck and Schludi 2000; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000).  
 
In short what we see is the adoption of three distinct strategies. Liberal countries, essentially 
the English speaking countries, chose the labour market deregulation option. At the time of 
the economic crisis these countries already have some of the most deregulated labour markets, 
and the little rigidity that exists is done away with. This entails, in countries like the US and 
Britain, an important weakening of the labour movement and its power to stage industrial 
actions. The result is an adjustment process based on market mechanisms, which produces 
high levels of inequality. Continental European countries, instead, follow the so called “labour 
reduction route”, consisting of incentives to leave the labour market for older workers, 
especially those in declining industries and for women (Esping-Andersen 1996). Nordic 
countries, instead, building on a comprehensive system of active labour market policies, 
developed a strategy based on employment expansion in the public sector. The 1970s, for 
example, see the beginning of a decade long process of building up a labour intensive system 
of social services (especially childcare and older persons care services), which has the result 
of increasing the supply of labour and ultimately the total quantity of employment.  
 
This divergence is widely discussed in the literature of labour market trajectories and welfare 
regimes. What is somewhat less know, but extremely important to understand subsequent 
developments in employment policy trajectories, is the adoption, in continental European 
countries, of employment protection laws. In many cases employment protection existed 
before the 1970s, but when confronted with a major employment crisis, some continental 
European countries make it more difficult for employers to lay off their workers. The various 
ingredients of a policy response to the unemployment crisis of the late 1970s are combined in 
very distinctive ways, so as to reflect different welfare state and labour market regime types. 
Next we illustrate these trajectories on the basis of three examples that are typical of each 
regime-type: the UK (liberal), Germany (Conservative) and Sweden (Social democratic). 
 
UK: market-based adjustment 
The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 signals the end of Keynesian macro-economic 
management, a policy paradigm that had inspired postwar British governments regardless of 
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political orientation2. Monetarism, the new economic credo, implied that state intervention in 
the economy had to be limited to the setting of interest rate at the appropriate level and that 
combatting inflation was to be given priority over the fight against unemployment. The early 
Thatcher years saw the adoption of a tight monetary policy, which succeeded in containing 
high inflation rates only at the cost of a massive increase in unemployment (between 1980 and 
1984, see fig. 1 above), and some cuts in social programmes. 
 
In the field of employment policy, the measures adopted resulted in the strengthening of the 
liberal character of the UK labour market. The few forms of direct control over the labour 
market, such as the Wages councils, were done away with. Wage councils, were set up in 
1909 with the task of setting minimum wages in low skill industries. Hey never played a 
substantial role:  in 1968 they covered only 3.5 million workers and in 1984 2.7 million, 
mainly in catering, retail trade and hairdressing, with about a third of those covered earning 
the minimum wage. Wages councils were weakened on various occasions by the Thatcher 
governments in the 1980s, and were finally abolished in 1993 (Addison and Siebert 1993): 
372-3; (Glennerster 1995): 216).   
 
In the field of unemployment compensation, a modest earnings-related supplement to 
unemployment benefit was abolished in 1979 and never reintroduced. In 1986, the duration of 
the unemployment insurance benefit was reduced to 6 months, leaving social assistance 
(called “income support”) responsible the for income security of those unable to re-enter the 
labour market. The result of these measures was a shift away from social insurance and 
towards a residual, means tested system (Erskine 1997). During the same years, new 
requirements were imposed on unemployment benefit and income support recipients, to 
ensure availability for work and training. As a result of these changes, beneficiaries who 
refuse to comply can be sanctioned with benefit reductions or withdrawal. 
 
Finally, the third pillar of liberalisation of the UK labour market consisted in a radical 
reduction of trade unions’ influence in the workplace and in politics. Traditionally, British 
unions had been rather effective in guaranteeing high wage growth and good fringe benefits to 
their members. A series of laws adopted from 1980 onwards made it more difficult to 
organise industrial action, by requesting a ballot to be held, by outlawing political strikes and 
by holding unions responsible (financially) for any losses due actions not respecting the new 
rules.  
 
State intervention in the functioning of the labour market has traditionally been limited in the 
UK, but after Thatcher the liberal character if its welfare state and employment structure was 
clearly reinforced. In a way, the transformation of the British political economy that took 
place under Thatcher was very much in line with the tradition of liberal British capitalism 
(Rhodes 2000). 
 
Germany: the labour reduction route 
When confronted with similar challenges in the late 1970s and early 1980s, continental 
European countries reacted differently. The main strategy to deal with industrialisation was to 
take out of the labour force those who were being laid off by restructuring industries. As a 
result in the Netherlands one saw a dramatic expansion in invalidity benefit recipiency, 
                                                 
2 It has been argued that the de facto abandonment of Keynesianism was the result of austerity measures adopted 
by the previous labour government between 1976 and 1978. 
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France reduced the age of retirement to 60 and introduced generous provision for early 
retirement, and Italy, with a retirement age of 55 (women) and 60 (men) provided easy ways 
to exit from the labour market.  
 
Germany was no exception. Like other continental European countries, today it stands out for 
a comparatively low employment rate of older people, especially men. This is largely a result 
of policy initiatives taken since late 1970s with the aim of compensating for the social cost of 
restructuring industry and the decline of industrial employment. The German welfare state 
provides a number of routes to early exit from the labour market.  Since 1957 it has been 
possible for unemployed people to take early retirement at age 60 without reduction in the 
benefit level. From the late 1970s onwards the use of this option increased substantially, often 
with firms laying off workers as they reached age 59, who would be first entitled to one year 
unemployment insurance benefit and then 5 years pre-retirement for older unemployed 
people. Its use was so widespread that this practice became known as the 59er rule. In the 
1980s, the duration of unemployment insurance benefits was extended to three years for 
jobless people aged 54 or over, as a result of which firms could dismiss employees at the age 
of 57, knowing that the welfare state would guarantee them a decent income until the age of 
retirement. In contrast to other countries, disability insurance has not been used as a major 
route to labour market exit. This is probably due to the existence of strict requirements in 
order to qualify for it, and to the availability of more appealing alternatives (Ebbinghaus 
1998; Manow and Seils 2000). 
 
In addition to early retirement, labour supply was controlled also through family and fiscal 
policy, essentially by failing to adapt these two important areas of economic policy to changes 
in the aspirations of women, who more or less simultaneously with deindustrialisation, were 
claiming more equality including in the labour market. In Germany, changes in women’s 
aspirations became a political issue in the 1980s, with the introduction of a relatively generous 
parental leave scheme. The decision to step into this then new social policy field was part of a 
reorientation in the CDU/CSU social policy, which culminated in the 1985 Essen party 
conference. On that occasion, the new orientation in family policy was elaborated. According 
to a long standing CDU social policy advisor, "the driving force of the Essen party conference 
was the realisation by the general secretary, Heiner Geissler, that if the party didn't change its 
approach in gender issues, it would loose its attractiveness for women" (quoted in (Aust and 
Bönker 2004). Interestingly, the practical results of the reorientation, included only measures 
that  help women with children by supporting them in their capacity of carers, not so much of 
workers. The measures included a long parental leave and the introduction of pension 
contribution credits for unpaid caring work performed mostly by women.  
 
This approach can be understood with reference to two factors. To consider women as 
primarily informal care providers was consistent with the social catholic ideology dominant in 
the Christian Democratic party, and certainly made it easier for the party leadership, 
concerned by the prospect of losing the female electorate, to get the endorsement of the party 
grassroots and of those with more traditionalist views. Second, and more importantly from the 
point of view of this chapter, the emphasis on measures that while helping mothers reduce 
their labour supply, was a policy that fitted well with the direction taken in employment 
policy. The new family policy developed by the Kohl government was a skilful move. It 
allowed him to do something popular with women, and at the same time to remain consistent 
with the policy option of containing labour supply. 
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The third element of continental European countries response to deindustrialisation was a 
strengthening of employment protection laws. Employment protection was strong in some 
countries in the early postwar years, but in the late 1970s and early 1980s we see an 
acceleration of measures that are aimed at making it difficult for employers to dismiss their 
workers. As shown in table 1, this is the case above all in continental European countries, 
which by the mid-1980s display the highest levels of employment protection. Sweden also 
increase employment protection levels during the same years, but reduced them again soon 
after (the index for Sweden declines rapidly after 1987: 1.53 in 1988-1995 and 1.10 in 1998). 
 
Table1: Strictness of employment protection legislation. Index 0-2, 0 = virtually no 
employment protection; 2 = extremely strong employment protection) 
 1960-1964 1965-1972 1973-1979 1980-1987 
Denmark 0.90 0.98 1.10 1.10 
Sweden 0.00 0.23 1.46 1.8 
     
France 0.37 0.68 1.21 1.30 
Germany 0.45 1.05 1.65 1.65 
Italy 1.92 1.99 2.00 2.00 
     
UK 0.16 0.21 0.33 0.35 
US 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Source: Nickell 2003 
 
In one of the most lucid analysis of the continental-conservative labour market and welfare 
state regime, Esping-Andersen uses two metaphors to describe it: the labour reduction route 
and the “ring fenced labour market”. The former refers to the incentives provided to older 
workers and women to stay away from the labour market. The latter highlights the high 
degree of protection enjoyed by those who are in core employment, thanks also to strong 
employment protection legislation, and the difficulties that more marginal people face in 
entering the labour market. 
 
Sweden: expanding employment 
Nordic countries, typified by Sweden, followed yet another trajectory in response to 
deindustrialisation. Losses in industrial employment were dealt with with instruments that had 
already been around for a couple of decades: active labour market polices. In the 1950s 
Sweden developed an employment regime based on egalitarian collective wage bargaining, 
full employment and active labour market policies, the so called Rehn-Meidner model 
(Benner and Vad 2000). These were meant to allow constant adaptation of labour supply to 
demand, by training workers from declining industries so that they could take up new jobs 
where they were created. Active labour market policies turned out to be extremely useful in 
dealing with the side effects of postindustrialisation: inegalitarian wage pressures and the 
possible emergence of a working poor problem, and the risk of skill obsolescence.  
 
But active labour market polices were not the only significant new policy adopted in the 
1970s. At that time in Sweden women were going through a process of change in their 
preferences in relation to the balance between employment and family life. This sea change in 
women’s aspirations was spotted by the ruling Social democrats, who soon decided to make it 
a central feature of their social policy, adopting the reconciliation of work and family life as a 
policy objective. Sweden did have a tradition in providing child care services, but these were 
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set up in the context of combating poverty rather than in order to facilitate the conciliation of 
employment and family life (Morel 2001).  In fact, the development of extensive child care 
coverage and other policies supporting women's (and mothers') employment followed the 
expansion of female employment; it did not precede it (Leira 1992). Like in much of 
continental Europe today, the late 1960s and early 1970s for working mothers in the Nordic 
countries were dominated by juggling, having to a large extent to rely on informal care (Leira 
1992; Naumann 2001). The reorientation of the Nordic welfare state began in the 1970s. 
Sweden introduced individual taxation in 1971, its first law on preschool education in 1973, 
parental leave in 1974.  A law on child care was introduced in Norway in 1975. 
 
The result of this reorientation of social and in particular family policy in Sweden was 
twofold. First, childcare centres and other expanding social services needed to be staffed, and 
this contributed to a massive increase in public employment, at a time when private sector 
employment was declining. Second, women's employment probably contributed to an overall 
expansion in employment. With increasingly large numbers of women, including mothers of 
small children entering the labour market, aggregate demand for family services (cleaning, 
washing, cooking, childcare) increased and resulted in additional job creation (Esping-
Andersen 2000).  
 
The Swedish, and more in general, the Nordic response to the challenges of the 1970s, 
deindustrialisation and change in women’s aspirations, was rather successful at the time, 
Sweden succeeding in containing open unemployment until the early 1990s. However, its 
most significant feature is the fact that it has transformed Nordic welfare states and labour 
markets in a way that makes them considerably more suited to the current postindistrial socio-
economic setting than their liberal or continental European counterparts. Decisions taken in 
response to the crises of the 1970s and early 1980s affect countries’ ability to cope with the 
challenges of the 1990s and 2000s 
 
Stage 2: Adapting employment and social policies to 
postindustrial labour markets 
Initial responses to deindustrialisation go back to the 1970s and during the 1980s, most 
countries stick to the approach adopted back then. It is only in the 1990s that something seems 
to change in the assessment of the adequacy of labour market polices in English speaking and 
continental European countries. The reasons that push governments to reconsider the choices 
made one or two decades earlier are different across groups of countries. 
 
English-speaking countries 
Political leaders in English-speaking countries, in the US and especially in the UK, realised 
that an unregulated labour market coupled with excess supply of low skill labour results in 
extremely low wages, lower than any reasonable poverty line. This has two consequences. 
First, living conditions of low skill workers and their families are deteriorating, contributing 
to social problems. Second, to the extent that the state intends to run an anti-poverty policy, 
low equilibrium wages for low skill workers mean a serious incentive problem. Low wages 
can be lower than the social assistance level, so that in many cases work does not pay. This is 
especially the case when several means-tested benefits are combined (e.g. free health care 
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through Medicaid in the US and help with accommodation costs through housing benefit in 
the UK). 
 
It is in the late 1980s and 1990s that both the UK and the US begin to take these issues 
seriously. Both countries had already in place income supplements programmes for low paid 
workers (Earned Income Tax Credits in the US and Family Credits in the UK). These are 
strengthen with a view to reinforce work incentives, making sure that it always pays to work, 
including for low skill individuals with large families. The reformed tax credit programmes, 
in both countries, guarantee income levels well above the (meagre) social assistance level to 
all those who work a minimum number of hours per week.  Second, both countries have 
strengthened their ALMPs, though, contrary to the approach taken in the Nordic countries, 
then main emphasis here is on pushing people back into the labour market and not so much in 
providing them with new skills. This is especially the case of the US, whose approach is 
reflected in an unusually high rate of sanctions for social assistance recipients (OECD 2003).  
In both countries most of these reforms are adopted by progressive governments (New Labour 
in the UK and the Clinton administration in the US), but they do not seem to reflect partisan 
politics. In many cases the reforms where initiated by previous, right-wing governments. In 
the US, because of divided government, Clinton’s plans require the support of the 
Republicans in parliament.  
 
In line with earlier developments in the Nordic countries, the UK has also invested 
considerably in the development of childcare services and work-life balance policies in recent 
years. The New Labour government elected in 1997, found itself in a situation that could be 
characterised by an almost total absence of provision in this field, and by strong expectations 
from working women and families for more to be done. In fact, work-life balance policies 
featured prominently in the 1997 election manifesto that brought Labour back to power after 
17 years of Conservative rule. A chapter on "work and family" included promises to "help 
parents, especially women, to balance family and working life" and to introduce a "limited 
unpaid parental leave"(Labour Party 1997). 
 
The promises were followed by policies. The first high profile initiatives in this area were, in 
1998, the launching of a "national childcare strategy", which had the objective through the 
coordinated effort of various actors to expand childcare coverage, and the publication of a 
Green paper on childcare. The Green paper focus was on improving the quality, the 
affordability and the accessibility of childcare. The document made reference to non-working 
mothers, and to the fact that lack of childcare was often an obstacle to employment, especially 
for single parents (British Government 1998).  
 
A childcare tax credit was introduced in October 1999, as part of a larger tax credit scheme 
(Working families' tax credit).  It consists of a means-tested tax credit available to parents 
who work more than 16 hours a week and use approved forms of childcare. The credit covers 
70% of costs up to a maximum. Eligibility depends on income, family configuration and other 
factors. As an example, in 1999, a family with two children younger than 11, where one adult 
works at least 30 hours per week, was entitled to some help as long as its annual income did 
not exceed approx. 14,000 GBP per annum (or 65 % of average full time earnings). At the end 
of 1999 there were over 800,000 families receiving WFTC, a number which increased to 1.1 
million in May 2002, most of them eligible for the child care tax credit (British Government 
1998). The same year, 1999, saw the adoption of provision for parental leave. This remained 
modest by European standards, as the scheme essentially translates the minimum 
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requirements of the EU directive. Each parent can take up to 13 weeks unpaid leave before the 
child 5th birthday, in addition to maternity leave (Hall 1999). 
 
Work-life balance polices maintained a prominent place also in the second term of the Blair 
government.  They extended their reach upwards in the income distribution, but developed 
also a stronger anti-poverty orientation. This was the case of other schemes targeted at 
disadvantaged families and neighbourhoods (like the Surestart programme). These 
developments need to be seen also in the context of New Labour's emphasis on the 
eradication of child poverty. To facilitate parents' employment is considered to be the most 
effective strategy to deal with child poverty.  
 
Continental European countries 
Continental European countries were forced to reconsider their initial response to 
postindustrialisation essentially for financial reasons. The approach developed in the 1970s 
turned out to be unsustainable. Facilitating labour market exit whether through early 
retirement pensions (Germany, France) or Invalidity benefit (the Netherlands) is extremely 
costly. Because of the employment-based financing method adopted in these welfare states 
(employer-employee contributions), these cost directly impact on labour costs, making job 
creation in the low productivity, low skill sectors difficult. This problem is compounded by 
strict employment protection laws, constituting a further obstacle to the expansion of this 
segment of the labour market. 
 
As a result, continental European countries in the 2000s are struggling to correct past 
mistakes, but are finding the process extremely difficult. The reform of labour market policies 
is based on three elements, which are more or less developed in different countries: less 
restrictive employment protection, some investment in active labour market policies, and 
some investment in work-life balance policies. Developments in these three areas are 
reviewed next. 
 
Continental and especially southern European countries are confronted with the most serious 
unemployment problems, in particular youth unemployment. It has been shown by labour 
economists that strict employment protection laws have a strong effect on the composition of 
unemployment. Where protection is strong, women and young people are more likely to be on 
the dole. Some continental and southern European governments have taken this research 
seriously, though they have so far generally refrained from abandoning high employment 
protection levels for core workers. Instead, they have created a whole range of new 
employment contracts that are available to employers wishing to take on new workers and 
provide an alternative to the highly protected unlimited job contracts. This has been the case 
in particular in Italy, Spain and France. All these countries have seen the proliferation of new 
types of employment contracts, in general with very low levels of protection, whether from 
dismissal or social protection. In Italy, a law inspired by Marco Biagi, a labour economist 
killed by the Red Brigades in 2002, made it possible for employers to recruit workers on 
temporary contracts, on contracts related to a specific task, on part-time contracts, etc.. One 
result of these (and previous) labour market reforms has been a sizeable expansion in 
employment, almost entirely due to the new contracts. Between 2002 and 2005, some 600,000 
new jobs were created, of which the vast majority through the new contracts (ISTAT 2006). 
Labour market deregulation has been pursued essentially without questioning the status of 
core workers, who still enjoy high levels of protection against dismissal.  
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Active labour market polices and work-life balance policies have entered public debates in 
most continental European countries, but steps in the development of these polices have been 
rather limited in comparison to Nordic countries but also in comparison to the UK, though 
national trajectories are somewhat different in this respect. France is a country that stands out 
in continental Europe for a strong emphasis on work-life balance policies, especially child 
care. This has largely historical reasons, and constitutes an exception in continental Europe 
(Morgan 2001; Daguerre 2006). In relation to active labour market policies, France has 
invested non negligible amounts of money in this field. French “reinsertion” policies, 
however, generally do not aim at reinsertion into labour markets (reinsertion professionnelle) 
but at making sure that unemployed people remain part of mainstream society (reinsertion 
sociale). In this respect, the French trajectory is rather atypical. In Germany, the Social 
democratic governments of the late 1990s early 2000s have tried to reorient polices towards 
women, by emphasising more the availability of childcare as a policy objective. Actual 
initiatives, however, have been limited and Germany remains a low spender in family 
services. High and persistent rates of unemployment have pushed policy makers to invest 
more funds in ALMPs. However, the social insurance character of the unemployment 
compensation system in that country has limited the extent to which this instrument can be 
used effectively (Clasen and Clegg 2006). Italy, finally, has clearly been lagging behind in 
relation to both policy areas. Some regional level initiatives in the field of labour market 
policy have taken place, especially in the North of the country. Childcare, instead, remains an 
affair for the family or (less frequently) the private sector. 
 
Nordic countries 
Even though Nordic countries developed responses to deindustrialisation that were to turn out 
to be particularly suitable to the current postindustrial context, some further adaptation was 
needed there too. Policy change became inevitable in these countries also as a result of 
economic internationalisation, and the need to develop welfare states and labour market 
regimes compatible with their strongly internationalised economies (Benner and Vad 2000). 
This meant in the early 1990s, when Sweden was confronted with high budget deficits, cuts in 
social benefits and some other austerity measures. These decisions, however, were reversed 
when in the late 1990s as the economic and the budget situations improved. Both Denmark 
and Sweden had to strengthen the pro-employment orientation of their welfare states, which 
remain viable as long as a high proportion of the working age population is in employment. 
This effort resulted in increased investments in active labour market polices, more explicitly 
oriented towards re-entry in employment. Denmark has contributed to popularise the so called 
“flexicurity” model, based on low employment protection and high levels of labour market 
flexibility combined with relatively high benefits for the unemployed and access to extensive 
active labour market programmes. 
 
The Nordic countries were also forced to continue adapting their welfare states during the 
1990s and 2000s, but the extent of change was limited, because decisions compatible with the 
new socio-economic setting had already be taken in the 1970s. Both their trajectory and their 
outlook in the 1990s and 2000s are dramatically different from those of the liberal and 
especially, the continental European welfare states.  
Conclusion: big obstacles and limited convergence 
Often in public policy, as well as in many other areas of life, inefficient solutions persist long 
after the discovery of more efficient ones. Economic historians have termed this phenomenon 
“path dependency”(Pierson 2000). The development of employment and social polices in 
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western countries provides yet another example of it. It has become clear and it is being 
increasingly recognised by labour market experts, politicians of different political persuasion, 
national and supranational organisation that several aspects of the Nordic model are essential 
for a welfare state to survive in the current postindustrial social and economic context. These 
are summed by the notion of flexicurity, but include also the arsenal of polices that help 
parents reconcile work and family life. This has been recognised by international agencies 
such as the OECD, by the EU, which makes this point very strongly periodically in the 
documents published in the context of the European Employment Strategy. It is also 
acknowledged by national political leaders in continental Europe, including in those countries 
that seem most intractable such as Germany and Italy.  
 
Nonetheless, little is moving. There are obviously important obstacles which have to do with 
entrenched interests, but also with the “inconvenient” timing of the various postindustrial 
developments in continental Europe. In the Nordic countries, the expansion of service 
employment and the emergence of new aspirations among women concerning the balance 
between family and professional life occurred in the 1970s, a time when population ageing 
was not yet inflating pension and health care budgets. In contrast, continental European 
countries such as Germany and Italy have entered the postindustrial era somewhat later, in the 
1990s or even in the 2000s. In both countries, current labour market problems and women’s 
aspirations have to compete with the preservation of the welfare state inherited from the 
postwar years for politicians’ attention. Differences in the timing of crucial socio-economic 
developments, like deindustrialisation, changes in women’s aspiration, and population ageing, 
are likely to play a crucial role in determining countries’ ability to adapt to the postindustrial 
world (Bonoli 2007). 
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